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133.– Regulatory reform in Europe and the promotion of better regulation and good
governance are at the core of the priorities of the successive EU Presidencies 1. It aims
to bring forward the Lisbon Strategy as amended in March 2005 2 and to progress with
the better regulation package proposed by the Commission. This package aims among
others at cutting excessive red tape and an annual simplification rolling programme
because the European Commission has estimated that a 25 % reduction in the admi-
nistrative burden in the EU Member States would lead to a 1-1,4 % increase in real
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
134.– The major difficulty in improving governance at EU level is that the respon-
sibilities for economic regulation are usually spread between different levels and
authorities 3. Regulation at EU level coexists with regulation at the level of the
Member States while sector specific regulation coexists with rules horizontally appli-
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cable to all sectors (such as competition law or consumer protection legislation).
There are few examples of regulatory reforms which could strike a balance between
these different sets of rules. A recent example which is worthwhile to study when
envisaging regulatory reform in other sectors is the reformed 2003 Regulatory Frame-
work for electronic communications 4. This framework strikes a new and original
balance of power between the European Commission and the National Regulatory
Authorities (NRAs), between harmonisation and decentralisation as well as between
sector-specific regulation and competition law.
135.– Our paper sets out how the reformed Framework for electronic communica-
tions is designed and how it works in practice. The first section lists the issues at stake
in the electronic communications sector. The following three sections review in
detail how the different roles of the Commission — legislating, implementing and
monitoring — are put in practice. The last section gives a conclusion based on two
years of experience. The main finding is that the framework works relatively well in
practice with regard to the harmonisation objective and that it can possibly be exten-
ded to other sectors.
I. GOOD GOVERNANCE 
IN THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 5
136.– After nearly 20 years of EU liberalisation policy that aimed amongst others to
develop a common market for telecommunications 6, Europe still does not have such
4. The 2003 Framework is mainly made of four harmonisation directives and one liberalisation
directive : Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework
Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/33 ; Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Autho-
risation Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/21 ; Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks
and services (Access Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/7 ; Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and user’s rights relating to electronic commu-
nications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/51 ; Commission Direc-
tive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications
networks and services (Liberalisation Directive), O.J. [2002] L 249/21. On those directives, see Garzanit
[2003].
5. The principles of good governance are described in the Communication from the Commission
of 10 November 1999, The 1999 Communications Review. Towards a new framework for Electronic
Communications infrastructure and associated services, COM(1999) 539, hereafter Communication
Review, at 14-17.
6. Which was initiated by the Communication of the Commission of 30 June 1987, Towards a
Dynamic European Economy : Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Tele-
communications Services and Equipment, COM(87) 290.
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single market. There are few pan-European offers and even fewer pan-European
groups 7 (except in the mobile sector with Vodafone and Orange). Different reasons
may account for this fragmentation : the lack of pan-European demand, the history
of the sector characterised by national monopolies which still counts today many
public enterprises, and the continued existence of divergent national regulatory poli-
cies in each Member State 8.
137.– This is unfortunate as economic studies show that a more integrated market
for services, in particular for Information and Communications Technology (ICT)
services, would benefit the European growth 9. On the other hand, it would be poli-
tically unfeasible and economically inefficient to regulate and monitor the whole
ICT sector at the European level only. The economic theory of federalism shows
that the optimal level of decision depends on a trade-off between, on the one hand,
externalities and economies of scale, and on the other hand, the heterogeneity of
preferences and needs, and that these factors evolve over time and depend on the
impacts of economic integration 10. In electronic communications, this theory may
plead for a unified policy for mobile regulation 11, while allowing different policies for
the regulation of broadband Internet access 12.
138.– The 2003 Framework establishes therefore an institutional design that aims to
foster a common regulatory culture and lead to the optimal levels of government for
each type of decision, and be politically acceptable for all parties involved.
Indeed, political acceptance is a key component of good governance.
139.– During the adoption of the 2003 regulatory framework, the European Parlia-
ment pleaded for a European Regulatory Authority as an essential component of the
establishment of a common market for electronic communications. The Commission
was against such Authority 13 because of an independent study finding no industry
support for a new European body 14 and because of its long-standing ambivalence
towards the creation of new institutions with which it may have to compete 15. The
7. Until today, only two cross-country full merger have been implemented in the telecommuni-
cations sector : the mergers between Telia of Sweden and Sonera of Finland and between Telefónica and
Cesky Telecom.
8. In addition, the regulation of the provision of electronic communications services was, in many
Member States, burdensome, while procedures were only transparent to a limited extend, which affec-
ted legal certainty and dissuaded (in particular cross-border) investments. Moreover, the remit of sector-
specific telecommunications regulation and of the application of competition law was not specified so
that there were many overlaps between sector-specific regulators and competition authorities leading
sometimes to inconsistent interventions and, in other cases, to negative conflicts of interest.
9. Copenhagen Economics [2005].
10. See Sapir [2004 : 184], drawing from Alesina et al. [2005], Tabellini [2003].
11. Hazlett [2003].
12. Brennan [2003].
13. 1999 Communications Review, p. 9.
14. Eurostrategies/Cullen International [1999].
15. Communication from the Commission of 11 December 2002 on the operating framework for
the Regulatory Authorities Agencies, COM(2002).
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Member States were strongly opposed to a fully-fledged ERA as encroaching the
powers of their own NRAs 16.
140. – At the end, the different branches of the European legislator agreed on a
compromise approach, whereby all regulatory powers were devolved to the National
Regulatory Authority that exists in each Member States 17 counterbalanced by the
empowerment of the Commission to veto certain NRAs decisions 18 and by enhan-
ced co-operation mechanisms between NRAs 19 to foster a common regulatory
culture (in particular a compulsory mutual consultation, collaboration for regula-
tion of trans-national market and resolution of trans-national dispute, and the crea-
tion of the European Regulators Group) 20.
141. – In the following sections we analyse in more detail how the Commission
applies the three powers entrusted to it under article 211 EC 21 in the electronic
communications sector. Under this provision, the Commission enjoys firstly an
exclusive power to propose new EU laws, which enables it to control the EU regu-
latory agenda, secondly has a power to adopt the implementing rules and thirdly, the
power to monitor compliance of national measures with EU law and to pursue any
violation of EU law by the Member States (including their regulatory authorities).
16. Such body would indeed have been entrusted with more far-reaching powers than the current
co-ordination bodies at European level established on a pure inter-governmental basis which can ontly
issue non-binding recommendations like the European Radiocommunications Office (ERO) which
promotes the harmonisation of frequency usage or specialised agencies like European Telecommunica-
tions Standards Institute (ETSI), see : http://etsi.org/, or recently created European Network and Infor-
mation Security Agency (ENISA), see Regulation 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 10 March 2004 establishing the European Network and Information Agency, OJ [2004] L
77/1. See : http://www.enisa.eu.int/.
17. On the power of the NRAs, see Geradin and Petit [2004 : section 2] and Stevens and Valcke
[2003].
18. The so-called article 7 review, named after the relevant provision of the Framework Directive.
See infra. Note that during the negociation, the Council was also strongly opposed to the veto power
of the Commission as upsetting the institutional balance of the Treaty and as enchroachning the powers
of their NRAs : Statement of Reasons and Article 6 of the Common Position of the Council of
17 September 2001 on the Framework Directive, O.J. [2001] C 337/34. See also : Salterain Alonso
[2002]
19. Both means would ensure European harmonisation as well as keeping regulation within reaso-
nable limits, as it can be safely assumed that the Commission has less incentive to regulate than NRAs.
The Commission would generally adopt a less regulatory stance than the NRA for several reasons.
First, its existence does not depend on electronic communications regulation. Second, it takes the
interests of all the Member States into account, hence internalise the externalities created by the regu-
lation on firms active in one Member States but foreign to this State [Barros, 2004 : section 3]. Third,
it usually takes more of a long-term view than the NRAs. In any case, experience shows that NRAs are
not necessarily prone to de-regulation : Stern [2004], Larouche and de Visser [2005].
20. Respectively articles 7(2), 7(3), 16(5) and 21 of the Framework Directive. For a description
of the ERG, see infra.
21. For a recent overview of the role of the Commission in the electronic communications sector,
see Van Ginderacter [2004].
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II. THE USE OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF COMMISSION
142.– The Commission made an extensive use of its legislative powers 22 to set the
regulatory agenda in the sector since the beginning of the liberalisation programme
in 1987 23, up to the details of the obligations to be imposed on the operators of the
sector (e.g. regarding accounting separation and cost accounting methodologies).
However in the 2003 Framework, the Commission focuses more on procedures than
on detailed substance.
143.– In addition, the Commission relies more and more on the Open Method of
Coordination to build a European Information Society with its successive Actions
Plans 24. The method involves four steps 25 :
– fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achie-
ving the goals that they set in the short, medium and long terms ;
– establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and
benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different
Member Sates and sectors as a means of comparing best practice ;
– translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by
setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and
regional differences ;
– periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning
processes.
The influence of the Commission under this method is obviously weaker than
in case of drafting detailed rules and recommendations.
Hence, the Commission seems less and less shaping the regulatory agenda in the
sector to the benefit of more proactive Member States. An example is the regulatory
review performed by the British NRA, Ofcom, which is setting policy approaches
such as forbearance and equivalence on the EU agenda 26.
22. The Commission was helped by the Court of Justice, which interpreted the EC Treaty as
giving the Commission broad liberalisation powers : France and Others/Commission (Terminal Equipment
Directive case) C-202/88 [1991] ECR I-1223 and in Spain and Others/Commission (Service Directive case)
C-271, C-281 and C-289/90 [1992] ECR I-5833.
23. See Thatcher [1999].
24. Communication from the Council and Commission of 14 June 2000, eEurope 2002 : An
information society for all ; Communication from the Commission of 28 May 2002, eEurope 2005 : An
information society for all, COM(2002) 263 ; Communication from the Commission of 1 june 2005,
i2010 : A European Information Society for growth and employment, COM(2005) 229.
25. Para 37 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, March 2000.
26. Ofcom Final Statements of 22 September 2005 on the Strategic Review of the Telecommu-
nications and undertakings in lieu of a reference under the Enterprise Act 2002.
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III. THE USE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION POWERS 
OF THE COMMISSION
144.– The 2003 Framework, and in particular article 8 of the Framework Directive,
sets out clear policy objectives that must be pursued by the NRAs. On that basis, the
Commission endeavours to build a consensus among NRAs on a common regulatory
vision, which is particularly important given the broad margin of discretion left to
NRAs. To do so, the Commission relies on two main fora : the Communications
Committee and the European Regulators Group.
145.– This leadership style of the Commission has been modelled by Barros [2004 :
section 3]. Generally, he assumes that the Commission would take an average posi-
tion among the different preferences of the NRAs, hence favouring less regulation
than some NRAs and more regulation than others 27. However in some circum-
stances, Barros shows that the Commission would prefer less regulation than any
individual NRA. That is the case when the Commission internalises the negative
effects of regulation on all European undertakings (being national of foreign to a
specific Member State) whereas an individual NRA takes only into account the
negative effects of regulation on national operators, ignoring the effects on foreign
operators. In these cases, Barros shows that the « less regulation » effect would domi-
nate the « averaging » effect.
A. THE COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE (COCOM)
146.– This first forum where the Commission promotes a common regulatory vision
is the Communications Committee (CoCom). This is a standard comitolgy Commit-
tee set up by the Framework Directive 28. It is composed of representatives of the
Commission and the Member States (in particular from the Ministries and, for some
contries, from the NRAs as well).
147.– On the one hand, the Committee has an informal role. It is a forum for discus-
sion and exchange of best practices among Member States. For instance, the natio-
nal transposition process and difficulties encountered by certain Member States have
been discussed in the Committee and the Commission tried to foster a common
interpretation of the provisions of the directives.
27. For instance, the Commission supports the regulation of mobile termination rate (see Recom-
mendation on relevant markets) whereas the German regulator opposes to it (see declaration of some
BNetzA officials like Groebel [2003]).
28. Article 22 of the Framework Directive and Council Decision of 28 June 1999 laying down the
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, O.J. [1999] L 184/23.
See the website of the CoCom at : http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/cocom1/home.
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148.– On the other hand, the Committee has also the formal role. It assists (and
controls) the Commission in implementing the directives. The CoCom must give its
non-binding opinion under the so-called advisory procedure 29 before the Commis-
sion can adopt recommendations or veto NRA decision under the article 7 review.
Until now, seven such Recommendations have been adopted after discussions in the
CoCom that led to a consensus or quasi consensus on their content 30. The CoCom
may also give a binding opinion under the so-called regulatory procedure before the
Commission can adopt decisions, hence the CoCom has the power to block by quali-
fied majority vote the proposed Commission Decisions. Such binding decisions can
only be adopted in numbering and standardisation issues and only one such binding
decision was adopted by the Commission to date 31.
B. THE EUROPEAN REGULATORS GROUP (ERG)
149. – The second forum where the Commission promotes a common regulatory
culture is the European Regulators Group (ERG). This forum is much more original
in the EU institutional landscape and has been set up by a Commission Decision. It
is composed of representatives of the Commission and the NRAs of each Member
State 32.
29. According to the article 19 of the Framework Directive.
30. Commission Recommendation of 20 March 2003 on the harmonisation of the provision of
public R-LAN access to public electronic communications networks and services in the Community,
O.J. [2003] L 78/12 ; Commission Recommendation of 23 July 2003 on notifications, time limits and
consultations provided for in article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks
and services, O.J. [2003] L 190/13 ; Commission Recommendation of 25 July 2003 on the processing of
caller location information in electronic communication networks for the purpose of location-enhan-
ced emergency call services, O.J. [2003] L 189/49 ; Commission Recommendation of 21 January 2005
on the provision of leased lines in the European Union (Part 1 : Major supply conditions for wholesale
leased lines), O.J. [2005] L 24/39 ; Commission Recommendation of 29 March 2005 on the provision
of leased lines in the European Union (Part 2. Pricing aspects of wholesale leased line part circuits), O.J.
[2005] L 83/52 ; Commission Recommendation of 6 April 2005 on broadband electronic communica-
tions through powerlines, O.J. [2005] L 93/42 ; Commission Recommendation of 19 September 2005 on
accounting separation and cost accounting systems under the regulatory framework for electronic
communications, O.J. [2005] L 266/64.
31. Commission Decision of 24 July 2003 on the minimum set of leased lines with harmonised
characteristics and associated standards referred to in article 18 of the Universal Service Directive,
O.J. [2003] L 186/43.
32. Recital 36 of the Framework Directive ; Commission Decision of 29 July 2002 establishing the
European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, OJ [2002] L 200/38,
as modified by Commission Decision of 14 September 2004, OJ [2004] L 293/30. Note that since the
amendment of the decision in 2004 only independent bodies are represented in the forum and minis-
tries with NRA’s competencies are no more entitled to participate, except at the invitation of the ERG
for specific topics for which they are competent. See the website of ERG : http://erg.eu.int.
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150.– Although legally, the ERG plays only an informal role of providing an inter-
face between its members and the Commission, it proved in practice to be a crucial
harmonisation tool. The ERG developed a common vision on issues such that bits-
tream access regulation or the application of the Long Run Incremental Cost metho-
dology 33. The ERG has prepared the revision of the recommendation on accounting
separation and proposed a wording on which the Commission based the proposal it
submitted to the CoCom.
The role of the Commission in consensus building can best be illustrated with
its approach to foster a consistent approach on regulatory remedies. In 2002, the
Commission appointed economic consultants to reflect on which competition
problems could be expected in fixed, mobile and broadband markets and which could
be the proportionate response of the NRAs 34. A discussion between the Commission
services, the NRAs and the consultants took place at the end of 2003 and the begin-
ning of 2004. A steering group brought to the floor several fundamental issues that
were further discussed by the heads of the NRAs at the ERG meetings, and then arri-
ved at a wording that revealed the complexities of the underlying issues as well as the
different approaches taken by NRAs. At the end, a common position was adopted
by the ERG in April 2004 with the assistance of the relevant Commission services 35.
IV. THE USE OF THE MONITORING POWER OF THE COMMISSION
A. DIRECT EX POST MONITORING :
INFRINGEMENT CASES AND YEARLY IMPLEMENTATION REPORTS
151.– The Commission further ensures a consistent regulation of the industry moni-
toring the implementation of EU framework by the Member States (and their
NRAs). For the previous 1998 framework, this monitoring role was facilitated by the
requirement 36 that Member States notify licensing procedures in draft form to the
Commission in order to allow it to comment on possible violation of EU obliga-
tions. When such comments were not taken into account, the Commission opened
formal proceedings. In practice, the Commission launched more 200 procedures, out
33. ERG Common Position of 2 April 2004 on Bitstream Access, ERG(03) 33rev1 ; ERG Consul-
tation Document of July 2003 on a Proposed ERG common position on FL-LRIC modelling.
34. See the reports of the Economic Expert Group on Remedies, Sept. 2003, available at :
http://www.europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ecomm/useful_information/library/studies_ext_consult/in
dex_en.htm.
35. European Regulators Group Common Position of 1 April 2004 on the approach to appro-
priate remedies in the new regulatory framework, ERG (03) 30rev1.
36. In accordance with the Directive 96/19/EC.
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of which about ten percent were conducted to the end and decided by the Court of
Justice. Interestingly, all but one of these cases related to legal national provisions
infringing EU law, and no case opened against the action of a national regulator 37
was yet brought to the Court of Justice.
152.– With regard to the 2003 regulatory framework, the Commission opened in a
first phase infringement procedures against Member States for delay in notification
of the national transposition measures and several Member States have already been
condemned by the Court of Justice 38. In a second phase, the Commission opened
several cases for incorrect transposition but the Court of Justice has not yet decided
any case 39. The judgments of the Court will, once available, provide legal certainty
as to the interpretation to be given to the relevant provision of the directives which
is important for directives that leave a wide margin of discretion to national legisla-
tors. Moreover, they may clarify the objectives of European law that the Court consi-
ders that Member States do not have correctly transposed and/or implemented. For
instance, under the previous 1998 regulation, the Court specified that the lack of
transparent rules as regards the granting of rights of way was tantamount to discri-
mination since the non-discrimination obligation had to be interpreted as aiming at
the objective of market opening 40. Infringement proceedings — next to requests for
preliminary rulings by national jurisdictions — play therefore a key role to ensure a
consistent regulation of the electronic communications sector in the EU.
153.– As noted in its Communication on the control of application of EU law 41, the
Commission opens infringement procedures only as last resort and relies first on
informal pressure mechanisms to ensure correct implementation of EU law. Thus, the
Commission services provide interpretative guidance on particular provisions of the
new directives in reply to specific questions coming from Ministries, NRAs or under-
takings and associations with interests in the communications sector. The Commis-
sion services held bilateral discussions with several Member States on draft
transposition laws where possible, responses have been made available on a collec-
tive basis within the framework of the CoCom. This approach fosters consistency of
application across the Community by making other Member States aware of speci-
37. Geradin [2004 : 1550] notes that the ECJ has never so far had the opportunity to rule that a
Member State infringed EC law because unlawful action by a NRA. However, nothing prevents that a
Member State be held liable for an unlawful action of its NRA as the case-law makes a very broad inter-
pretation of the categories of public undertakings that render a Member State liable of its actions :
Fratelli Costanzo/Milano 103/88 [1989] ECR I-1839.
38. Commission/Luxembourg C-236/04 [2005] nyr, Commission/Belgium C-240/04 [2005] nyr, Commis-
sion/Greece C-299/04 [2005] nyr, Commission/Luxembourg C-394/04 [2005] nyr, Commission/France C-31/05
[2005] nyr.
39. IP/05/430 of 14 April 2005, IP/05/875 of 7 July 2005, IP/05/1269 of 13 October 2005,
IP/05/1585 of 14 December 2005.
40. Commission/Luxembourg (Rights of way) C-97/01 [2003] ECR I-5797.
41. Communication from the Commission of 11 December 2002, Better monitoring of the appli-
cation of Community law, COM(2002)725, adopted as a follow-up of the White Paper on the European
Governance.
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fic issues of interpretation which were also relevant to their own situations and
enables them to give their views on the issues concerned. In addition, the Commis-
sion pursues its policy started in 1996 of publishing at the end of each year reports
on the state of implementation of EU law in all Member States 42.
B. INDIRECT EX POST MONITORING : ANTITRUST CASES
154. – In parallel to its direct ex post monitoring role, the Commission fosters a
consistent regulation, and in particular coherence between antitrust and sector regu-
lation, with its antitrust power. In the EU, antitrust law applies in parallel to natio-
nal sector-specific rules to the Member States (and their NRAs) as well as to the
telecom private and public operators 43. With regard to Member States, article 10 EC,
in conjunction with articles 81 and 82 EC, implies that NRAs may not enact
measures which would be contrary to European competition rules 44. Thus, if a NRA
would violate antitrust rules — for example by imposing price controls that leads to
a regulatory price squeeze the Commission could open an infringement procedure
against that Member State under article 226 EC 45. Similarly, compliance with natio-
nal regulatory decisions does not absolve undertakings of their duty to abide by their
obligations EC antitrust law 46.
In the framework of its antitrust powers, the Commission issued Guidelines
setting its interpretation of articles 81 and 82 EC to particular problems in the elec-
tronic communications sector. These Guidelines informed the operators concerned
and deterred them to behave anti-competitively, but also guided the NRAs (as well
42. Available at : http://www.europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ecomm/all_about/implementa-
tion_enforcement/index_en.htm. The last one : Communication from the Commission of 2 December
2005, European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 2004, COM(2004) 759.
43. On the application of competition law to electronic communications, see : Arino [2004 :
sections 2 and 3] ; de Streel [2004 : section 2] ; Garzaniti [2003 : chapters 7 and 8]. For a general over-
view of the relationship between NRAs and NCAs, see OECD [1999] and ICN [2004]. The applica-
tion of antitrust in addition to sector regulation is different from the US where antitrust usually will not
be applicable if sector regulation has been applied : Verizon v. Trinko 540 U.S. 682 (2004). See Larouche
[2006].
44. See : Temple Lang [1998] and [2006], Wainwright and Bouquey [2004] and cases cited therein,
like : GIB/ATAB 13/77 [1977] ECR 2115, para 31 ; Leclerc 229/83 [1985] ECR 1 ; Van Eycke 267/86
[1988] ECR 4769, para 16. In particular, the Court held that articles 10 and 81 EC are infringed where
a Member State requires or favours the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary
to article 81 EC, or where it divests its own rules of the character of legislation by delegating to private
economic operators responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere : Ahmed Saeed
66/86 [1989] ECR 1839.
45. However, note that the Commission has never so far launched an article 226 action on the
basis of articles 10 and 82 against a Member State. Until now, such cases were brought to the ECJ
through preliminary rulings and concerned article 81 cases [Geradin, 2004 : 1551].
46. Access Notice, para 22.
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as the NCAs) when applying antitrust concepts such as price squeeze and discrimi-
nation 47.
155.– In the past, the Commission also investigated competition problems in speci-
fic areas of the telecommunications sector and drew indirectly the attention of the
NRA on these problems. In 1998, it investigated the high retail prices for fixed to
mobile calls and the underlying excessive wholesale fixed and mobile termination
charges 48, leading to intervention of several NRAs. In 1999, the Commission opened
a formal sector enquiry 49 and investigated the conditions of provision of leased
lines 50, of local loop unbundling 51 and of mobile international roaming 52. For the
future, Commissioner Kroes made clear before the European Parliament that sector
enquiries will be used more 53.
156. – In merger cases, the Commission obtained extensive structural and beha-
vioural remedies from the parties. For instance in Telia/Telenor 54, the Commission
obtained from the parties a commitment to provide access to unbundled local loop
that was not imposed in Sweden at the time of the merger. In Telia/Sonera 55, the
Commission went further and imposed a legal separation between the operation of
networks and services of their fixed and mobile activities in Sweden and in Finland.
Such merger remedies have sometimes triggered regulatory changes extending powers
of NRAs in order to enable them to impose additional obligations 56. Similarly, the
Commission can in prohibition decisions under article 82 EC set principles which
will guide the intervention of NRAs in similar case. This was the case in the Wana-
47. Commission Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommuni-
cations sector, O.J. [1991] C 233/2 ; Commission Notice of 31 March 1998 on the application of compe-
tition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector, O.J. [1998] C 265/2, hereinafter
Access Notice ; Communication from the Commission of 26 April 2000 on the Unbundled access to the
local loop, O.J. [2000] C 272/55.
48. IP/98/141 of 9 February 1998.
49. See Choumelova and Delgado [2004]. The sector enquiries were adopted on the basis of
article 12 Regulation 17/68, which has been carried forward and extended in article 17 of Regulation
1/2003.
50. IP/99/786 of 22 October 1999 ; Commission services Working Document of 8 September 2000
on the initial results of the leased lines sector inquiry ; IP/00/1043 of 22 September 2000 ; IP/02/1852
of 11 December 2002.
51. IP/00/765 of 12 July 2000. Report done by Squire-Sanders-Dempsey, Legal Study on Part II of
the Local Loop Sectoral Inquiry, February 2002.
52. IP/00/111 of 4 February 2000 ; Commission services Working Document of 13 December 2000
on the initial findings of the sector inquiry into mobile roaming charges.
53. Kroes [2004 : 8]. See also the Communication from the Commission of 2 February 2005,
Working Together for growth and jobs : A new start for the Lisbon Strategy, COM(2005) 24, at 8.
54. Commission Decision of 13 October 1999, Telia/Telenor, M. 1439, OJ [2001] L 40/1. Unbund-
ling was imposed later in sector law by the Regulation 2887/2000/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 18 December 2000 on unbundling of the local loop, OJ [2000] L 336/4.
55. Commission Decision of 10 July 2002, Telia/Sonera, M. 2803.
56. See Arino [2004 : section 4], de Streel [2004a : section 2.3], Ungerer [2001].
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doo 57 decision, which established that the Internet subsidiary of France Telecom had
applied abusive predatory retail ADSL prices.
157.– When the NRA has the power to act and imposed remedies, antitrust decisions
must assess the market situation, taking into account the national regulatory
measures governing the relevant market and the efficiency of such measures (and
indirectly identify possible shortcomings). In its decisions allowing network sharing
agreements in Germany and the United Kingdom 58, the Commission took into
account the existing regulatory obligations, while setting a number of principles
which can be followed by the NRAs 59. This approach is in line with the case-law as
the Court of First Instance held in European Night Services 60 that the Commission
should not impose conditions under antitrust rules that are already provided by sector
regulation 61.
158. – On the other hand the Commission intervention can show the regulatory
failures of NRAs. This was the case 62 when the Commission condemned Deutsche
Telekom for abuse of dominant position relating to a pricing strategy which had
been reviewed by the NRA concerned. This decision is criticised by several authors
as creating legal uncertainties for the operators and encouraging multiple complaints.
Larouche [2004 : 42] notes that Deutsche Telekom has been put under the obligation
to petition the NRA to change its regulated tariffs in order to remove any price
squeeze which may arise and that the special responsibility of dominant players has
57. Commission Decision of 17 July 2003, Wanadoo, case 38.233, available at : http://europa.eu.int/
comm/competition/antitrust/cases/index/by_nr_76.html#i38_233, under appel case T-340/03.
58. Decision of the Commission of 30 April 2003, UK network sharing, OJ [2003] L 200/59 and
Decision of the Commission of 16 July 2003, Network sharing Rahmenvertrag, OJ [2004] L 75/32.
59. See also NewsCorp/Telepiu, where the Commission imposed remedies although the Italian
NRA had jurisdiction to act, but then relied on the NRA to monitor their implementation : Commis-
sion Decision of 2 April 2003, NewsCorp/Telepiu, M. 2876, OJ [2004] L 110/73, para 259. In a similar
merger in Spain Sogecable/ViaDigital, the Spanish Competition authority also imposed conditions to be
monitored by the NRA : Agreement of the Council of Ministers of 29 November 2002.
60. European Night Services/Commission T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94, T-388/94 [1998] ECR
II-3141, para 221. However, in TetraLaval C-12/03P, not yet reported, at para 75, the Court of Justice
adopted a much more nuanced approach. It judged that, in assessing a merger, the Commission should
not be required to consider the extent to which the incentives to engage in anti-competitive practices
would be reduced, or even eliminated, owing to the illegality of the conduct in question, the likelihood
of its detection, the action taken by the competent authorities, both at Community and national level,
and the financial penalties which could ensue.
61. Thus the approach to decide an antitrust intervention is different to the approach to decide
a regulatory intervention. In the former, the authority should take into account the regulation in place.
In the latter, the authority should not take into account the regulation to alleviate the vicious circle of
lifting regulation because the absence of competitive problems is merely due to the presence of the regu-
lation itself : on this so-called greenfield approach, see Di Mauro and Inotai [2004].
62. Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Deutsche Telekom, OJ [2003] L 263/9, appeal pending
Case T-271/03. Note that the Commission opened several other cases against Deutsche Telekom for
anti-competitive retail business tariffs (IP/96/543 of 25 June 1996 and IP/96/975 of 31 October 1996),
excessive charges of carrier selection and number portability (IP/98/430 of 15 May 1998), and price
squeeze between wholesale charge for lines sharing and retail DSL tariffs (IP/04/281 of 1 March 2004)
that implied a critique of the RegTP’s policy.
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been expanded quite far, so as to include a duty to second-guess regulatory decisions.
Geradin [2004 : 1552] notes that the most effective way to proceed would have been
to launch parallel actions under article 82 against the Deutsche Telekom and
article 86(1) combined with 82 against Germany.
159.– In any case, the Deutsche Telekom decision shows that the Commission can
control — ex post — the efficiency of NRA intervention and has thus an — ex
ante — means to foster coherence of sector regulation with the principles of antitrust.
Such indirect intervention can be expected even more in the current context where
the Commission seeks creating a consensus among NRAs, since it may be counter-
productive for such purpose to directly challenge NRAs decisions 63, in a hybrid
decentralised system between steered network and partnership 64.
On the other hand, the Commission may refrain to intervene in cases where NRAs
are competent on the basis that the case would not show sufficient Community
interest. The Commission does not intend to be an appeal body against NRAs deci-
sions. In addition, under the 2003 framework, in case of inappropriate intervention
of an NRAs, the Commission will be able to signal the possible incompatibility with
EU law during the article 7 procedure (confidentially) in the pre-notification
meetings or (publicly) in the comments letter 65, as set out in the following section.
C. DIRECT EX ANTE MONITORING : THE SIGNIFICANT MARKET POWER REGIME
160.– Infringement procedures take about 2-3 years to be decided 66 which may be
inadequately long for fast evolving markets, implying a very high cost for regulatory
errors. Moreover, such procedures take place ex post and may need a policy change
of the condemned Member State, implying further delays. Thus the 2003 frame-
work, grants the Commission the power to review ex ante 67 and possibly veto most
63. Along the same lines : Geradin [2004 : 1552], Petit [2004 : 27].
64. Following the expression of Sapir [2004 : 187].
65. If the NRA maintains its plans, a subsequent infringement procedure would not hamper legal
certainty as all actors would be informed via the article 7 comments letter of the doubts of the Commis-
sion regarding the NRAs’ remedies.
66. See the Annual Repport 2004 of the Court of Justice, p. 174, available at : http://curia.eu.int/
en/instit/presentationfr/index.htm.
67. Note that the relationship between the ex ante and the ex post mechanisms may be complex.
The fact that the Commission refrain from signalling any violation of European antitrust does not
impede the Commission to take later an action against the Member State for infringement (under
article 226 or 86 EC), nor to take an action against an operator for violation of articles 81 or 82 EC.
Along these lines, Commission Decision of 29 April 2004, AT/2004/44, Dispute settlement with regard
to access and interconnection. See similarly in a case dealing with the power of the Commission to notify
to the Member States a clear and manifest infringement of Community provision in the field of public
procurement, according to article 3 of directive 89/665 : Commission/The Netherlands C-359/93 [1995]
I-157, para 13.
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of the NRAs decisions related to economic regulation, adopted under the Significant
Market Power (SMP) regime 68.
161.– This regime 69 largely follows a three-steps sequence inspired by competition
law 70. In the first step, the Commission initiates the whole process by adopting a
Recommendation selecting and delineating the electronic communications markets
that are possibly subject to hard-core market power justifying regulation and that
should be analysed by the NRAs 71. Then, the NRAs select the markets susceptible
to regulation and delineate the boundaries of these markets with an antitrust metho-
dology taking utmost account of the Commission Guidelines 72. In the second step, the
NRAs analyse the defined market to determine if one or more operators enjoys signi-
ficant market power, which is equivalent to the dominant position in antitrust.
Finally in the third step, the NRAs impose on the operators designated as having
SMP regulatory remedies (like compulsory access, transparency, non-discrimination,
cost accounting, or price control) proportionate to specific objectives and submit
their conclusions to public consultation.
162.– NRAs must notify to the Commission any draft decision that affects the trade
between Member States 73 under the so-called article 7 procedure 74. Upon notifica-
tion, the Commission reviews the draft decision in two phases. During the first phase
68. Note that the ex ante control goes beyond the SMP regime as other economic regulation
NRAs’ decisions should also be notified to the Commission (article 5 Access Directive).
69. For a description : Bavasso [2004], Cave [2004], Garzaniti [2003 : chapter 1], Krüger and Di
Mauro [2003], Nihoul and Rodford [2004 : chapter 3], de Streel [2004].
70. The SMP regime does not totally follow the antitrust law as there is an additional preliminary
and important step : the selection of markets susceptible of regulation.
71. Commission Recommendation 2003/311 of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance
with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory
framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ [2003] L 114/45.
72. Commission Guidelines of 9 July 2002 on market analysis and the assessment of significant
market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
services, OJ [2002] C 165/6.
73. According Recital 38 of the Framework Directive, « Measures that could affect trade between
Member States are measures that may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the
pattern of trade between Member States in a manner that might create a barrier to the single market.
They comprise measures that have a significant impact on operators or users in other Member
States… ». These criteria result from the case law related to competition policy and the Internal
market : Société technique minière 56/65 [1966] ECR 235 at 249 ; Commercial Solvents 6/73, 7/73 [1974]
ECR 223 para 30-35. See also the Commission Guidelines of 30 March 2004 on the effect on trade
concept contained in article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ [2004] C 101/81.
74. Article 7 of the Framework Directive. For a preliminary assessment of the procedure, see the
Communication from the Commission of 6 February 2006 on Market Reviews under the EU Regula-
tory Framework : Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications, COM(2006) 28,
herein Communication on Markets Reviews. See also de Streel [2005].
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of one month 75, it may comment on the compatibility with EU law on each of three
aspects of the draft decision (market definition, SMP assessment and choice of reme-
dies). In addition, when the Commission has serious doubts as to the compatibility
of the two first aspects of the draft decision (i.e. market definition than differs from
the Commission Recommendation on relevant markets, and designation — or non
designation — of SMP), it may open a second phase review. During this second
phase of two months, the Commission may, after having consulted the CoCom under
the advisory procedure, veto market definition or SMP designation that would be
contrary to EU law and in particular the antitrust approach.
163.– In order to simplify and expedite the examination of a notified draft measure,
the Commission has adopted a procedural recommendation 76, which provides a stan-
dard format for notifications to be used by NRAs and clarifies the notification process
and the calculation of the legal time limits. Finally, the Commission gives NRAs,
who so request, an opportunity to discuss any draft measure they intend to adopt
before formal notification (pre-notification meetings).
164. – This ex ante monitoring mechanism has been modelled by Barros [2004 :
section 4]. He shows that the mechanism is efficient only if the cost for the Commis-
sion to force NRA to change decisions ex post would be so high that it makes sense
to have an ex ante control, and that is probably the case in the electronic communi-
cations 77.
165. – To summarize, the Commission has two very powerful means to ensure a
common regulatory approach thorough Europe. First, it defines upstream the « field »
of regulatory activity by issuing its Recommendation on relevant markets. This
means is very effective in practice as most NRAs follow the markets listed of the
Recommendation. Divergences consisted in nearly all cases in further segmentations
of the markets listed by the Commission 78. For example, several Member States
75. When article 7(3) of the Framework Directive was drafted, it was though that the first phase
control of the Commission would be run in parallel of the national public consultation, hence the time
limit for the phase I was one month or more if the national consultation period is longer. However, when
implemented, it was thought more appropriate to run the first phase control after the national consul-
tation (see CoCom 04-49 of 30 June 2004), hence the time limit is one month only.
76. Commission Recommendation of 23 July 2003 on notifications, time limits and consultations
provided for in article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services,
OJ [2003] L 190/13.
77. Thus Barros takes into account the cost of a policy change, which is higher when the control
takes place ex post rather than ex ante. However, his model does not take into account the cost of regu-
latory errors. Such cost may be particularly large when ex post procedures are slow relatively to the
rapid pace of market evolution and innovation may be very beneficial. For instance, Hausman [1997]
valued the delay of the introduction of voice messaging services from late 1970s until 1988 at US$
1.27 billion per year by 1994, and the delay of the introduction of mobile service at US$ 100 billion,
large compared with the 1995 US global telecoms revenues of $180 billion per year.
78. See Communication on Market Reviews.
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distinguished within the market for broadcasting transmission services, markets for
terrestrial and for satellite distribution.
166.– Second, the Commission reviews the NRAs’ draft decisions, and has in four
cases adopted veto decisions, while probably influencing many other NRA decisions
by comments in pre-notifications meetings or during the first phase of the procedure.
167.– In addition, the Commission used the article 7 procedure to signal to NRAs
infringement of European rules 79. For example, in a comment letter, the Commission
instructed the regulator to dis-apply national law supposedly violating the directives.
This law restricted the regulation of mobile termination to mobile-to-mobile calls,
thereby excluding the regulation of fixed-to-mobile calls contrary to the Access
79. For instance, the Commission reminded the Finnish NRA to impose the full set of obligations
provided by the directives with regard to the minimum set of leased lines and not only those deemed
to be the most appropriate (Commission Decision of 30 July 2004, FI/2004/79, referring to the obliga-
tions contained in Annex VII of the Universal Service Directive). Similarly, the Commission remin-
ded the Austrian NRA that, according the new framework, mobile number portability should be
imposed at the time of its application date (July 2003) and not later (Commission Decision of 26 June
2004, AT/2004/66-70, referring to article 30 of the Universal Service Directive).
The ex ante Significant Market Power control
1a. Market Selection – Recommendation by the Commission.
On the basis of 3 criteria – Decision by the NRA (under Commission veto).
1b. Delineation (product and – Product dimension : Recommendation by
geographic dimensions) the Commission ;
On the basis of the SSNIP test – Product and geographic dimensions : Decision by the
NRA (under Commission veto)
2. SMP assessment Decision by the NRA (under Commission veto).
Equivalent to dominant position
3. Choice of remedies
Transparency, non-discrimination, – In case of SMP operator ➩ Imposition of the appropriate
accounting separation, compul- obligations, by the NRA (with Commission opinion) ;
sory access, and cost-orientation – In case of no SMP operator ➩ Removal of any obli-
gation, by the NRA (with Commission opinion)
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Directive 80. Referring to the case law of the Court of Justice, the Commission remin-
ded that NRA of its right not to apply this Finnish law although no infringement
procedure against Finland had been opened at the time 81. This decision has been
criticised by some NRAs 82 as by-passing the normal infringement procedure provi-
ded in the Treaty and upsetting the balance between harmonisation and subsidiarity
that lies at the heart of the 2003 framework.
*
* *
168. – The challenge of the European legislator in adopting the 2003 Regulatory
Framework for electronic communications was to ensure an institutional design that
could deliver a consistent and coherent regulation of the electronic communica-
tions operators throughout the whole European union, while increasing the power
and the discretion of the NRAs to adapt to rapid market evolution. After two years
of experience, it seems that the existing and new co-ordination mechanisms are deli-
vering consistency and coherence 83. The two key elements of this success are the
powers of the Commission under article 7 of the Framework Directive (linked to use
of competition law approaches in sectoral regulation) and the European Regulators
Group.
169. – The harmonisation objective seems now better achieved than under the
previous regulatory framework. In the absence of a central regulator comparable to
the US Federal Communications Commission, divergent regulations of the provision
of electronic communications services, which are by nature to a substantial extend
cross-border, are not fully excluded. The Commission has not the power to prevent
it. In particular, there is no possibly for the Commission to take a case from a NRA
and decide it instead 84. Moreover, the co-ordination between National Courts, who
are reviewing the NRA decisions on appeal, is limited. There is only the standard
preliminary ruling procedure at the European Court of Justice and other mechanisms
80. Commission Decision of 17 December 2003, FI/2003/31, citing para 48-49 of Consorzio Indus-
trie Fiammiferi, C-198/01 [2003] I-8055.
81. Later on, the Commission opened an infringement procedure against Finland. This case is still
pending.
82. See Conclusions of the 7th Plenary of the ERG, 30 January 2004, ERG(04) 11, p. 2.
83. See the Communication on Markets Reviews, at 9.
84. Similarly to what was achieved with the decentralisation of European competition law :
article 11(6) of the Regulation 1/2003 and para 50-57 of the Commission Notice of 30 April 2004 on
cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ [2004] C 101/43.
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may have been provided (for instance the possibility of the Commission to intervene
as amicus curiae in the national court proceedings) 85.
170.– The 2003 framework rightly acknowledges that the harmonisation objective
can only be secured if a common regulatory culture emerges. The constructive coope-
ration of the NRAs in the ERG 86 shows that such common regulatory culture is
emerging.
Only an extended impact assessment could show all the benefits of the 2003
framework. At this stage it is nevertheless already possible to quote it as an example
of good governance at the EU level.
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